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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAI-I0 
VIICING CONSTRUCTION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
VS. 
HAYDEX lIAI<E IRRIGATION 
I)ISlRIC'T, nn Idaho quasi-munici~al 
Corpori~tion, 
I)efcndant/Rcspondent. 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 3623 1 
11ESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL I'KOM TI-IE DISTRICT COlJR'T OF THE 
FIRST JUDICIAL I)IS1'RICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TNE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
I-IONORABLE ,JOI1N P. LUSTER 
DISTIZIC'T JUDGE, PRESIIjING 
SCOTT I,. KOSIS 
300 W. Main Street, Ste. 153 
Boise. Ida110 83702 
AlIol.ney for 1'lain1ifi'/Appellai~t 
SlJSAW P. WEEKS 
.lames, Veriloll& Weelts, P.i\ 
I626 Laincoin Way 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 838 14 
Altori~eys for Defendant/Responden( 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In their opening brief on appeal, Appellant did not provide a statement of the case. 
Therefore, Respondent has provided a Statement of the Case. 
11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Hayden Lake Irrigation District ("HLID") is an irrigation district in North Idaho 
generally located north of Prairie Avenue and West of U.S. 95. In addition to delivering 
irrigation water, HLID maintains a domestic water system. R p. 94, Rose Affidavit, Exhibit A, 
p. 1 1 .  
Viking Construction, Inc. ( V i i g )  filed a declaratory judgment action and request for 
injunction against HLID on December 10,2004. R p. 2. On March 3 1,2008, the court allowed 
V i g  Construction to file an amended petition. In its amended petition, Viking Construction 
sought to have the connection fees it was charged to hook up to the district's domestic water 
system declared illegal and refunded, or in the alternative, to have any increase in the fee to be 
declared null and void. R p. 33. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On August 8,2008, V i g  filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. R p. 96. V i g  
sought summary judgment as a matter of law that the connection fees were (1) unconstitutional; 
(2) violated Idaho and federal statutory law; and (3) breached contracts between HLID and the 
United States. R p. 51. On August 22,2008, the trial court entered an ordering granting relief 
from its pretrial scheduling order and allowed the motion for summary judgment to be heard. R 
p. 98. HLlD filed its opposition memorandum on October 8,2008. R p. 100. On October 22, 
2008, the trial court heard the motion for summary judgment. R p. 98. The trid Court issued its 
Memorandum Opinion and Order in Re: Motion for Summary Judgment on January 14,2009. R 
1 
p. 130. A Summary Judgment was entered dismissing Viking's suit on January 29,2009. R p. 
152. 
C. Statement of Facts 
HLID's predecessor was Interstate Irrigation District, a privately owned Washington 
corporation. Interstate Irrigation District platted the Hayden Lake Irrigation Tracts on July 29, 
1910. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 1-7. The fust set of by-laws for HLID are dated 
August 3, 1915. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 10. At that time, the system included a 
domestic water system. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 11. 
Since 1947, the district has charged a "fee for connection to the domestic water system". 
This has been variously called a "tap-on fee", "hook-up fee" and "connection fee". R p. 95, 
Rose Affidavit, Exhibit "A", p. 19 (1947 by law); p. 26 (1969 by-law); p. 38 (1991 hook-on fee 
for domestic raised), Rohrbach Dep. Vol. I, p. 30, L. 10-14. The tap-on fee for domestic water 
use addressed in the 1947 Bylaw of the District provided for a tap-on fee for each new parcel 
connecting to the domestic water system. The fee elements included first, a flat amount due for 
connection to the main. Second, the actual additional expenses of making the connection, and 
third required the member pay to improve infrastructure if necessary to serve the new subdivided 
parcel. 
On September 7,2004, at a regular meeting and following a lengthy debate, HLID 
increased its connection fee for domestic connections by $500 to $2,700. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit 
Exhibit A, p. 138. The connection fee included two components; first, an equity buy-in 
component, second a remuneration component which the district collects for the actual cost of 
the meter and installation by the district to connect to the system. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit 
Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Vol. 11, p. 28, L. 1-20. The board understood that equity buy-in was 
compensation for those devices, appurtenances, infktructure, backbone, pumps, tanks and such 
items necessary to deliver water to the members that had been supported and mainkGned or kept 
operational by existing members for 50 plus years. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, 
Rohrbach Dep. Vol. I, p. 71, L. 8-1 7. At the time of setting the equity buy-in, the Board weighed 
and evaluated many factors regarding the amount of increase. It had the advisory committee 
recommendation on rates, had reviewed HLID's water management plan and had the water 
master's reports. Further it had information on a series of control system failures, had done 
analysis of the rates, and had input from its engineer clarifying those parts of the water 
management plan that addressed antiquated, obsolete or marginally functional areas of the 
district. Lastly, the Board also reviewed the general age and condition of the district's entire 
hhstmcture. All of these factors were weighed in determining the mount of the required 
increase. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit, Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Vol. I, p. 80, L. 8-25; p. 81 -82. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
In this matter, the trial court denied V i g ' s  motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed Viking's case because no issues remained for trial. In such circumstances, this Court 
held in Hanvood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672,677-678; 39 P.3d 612,617-618 (2001) : 
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of 
review is the same as the standard used by the district court in passing upon a 
motion for summary judgment. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166,170,16 P.34 
63,267 (2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and 
discoverv documents on file with the court. read in a light most favorable to the 
- 
non-mo;ing party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See id;  1.RC.P. 56(c). The 
burcien of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. See 
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969). 
In this case, partial summary judgment was granted to Hanvood, the non-moving 
party. This Court has determined "[s]ummary judgment may be rendered for any 
party, not just the moving party, on any or all the causes of action involved, under 
the rule of civil procedure" thus allowing trial courts flexibiity in determining the 
form of relief granted in summary judgment orders. Brummeft v. Ediger, 106 
Idaho 724,726,682 P.2d 1271,1273 (1984) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(a), (b), (c), (d)). 
The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the 
party has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion for summary 
judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; 
the moving party runs the risk that the court will find against it, as in this case. 
In instances where summary judgment is granted to the non-moving party, this 
Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party against whom summary 
judgment was entered. ANen v. Blaine County, 131 Idaho 138,141,953 P.2d 578, 
580 (1998); Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634,637,962 P.2d 
1018,1021 (1998). "The party against whom the judgment will be entered must 
be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why 
summary judgment should not be entered." Idaho Endowment Fund Im? Board v. 
Crane, 135 Idaho 667,671,23 P.3d 129,133 (2001) (citing Mason v. Tucker and 
Assoc., 125 Idaho 429,432,871 P.2d 846,849 (Ct.App.1994)); see also Kelly v. 
Hodges, 1 19 Idaho 872,876,811 P.2d 48,52 (Ct.App. 1991). It is also true that a 
district court may not decide an issue not raised in the moving party's motion for 
summary judgment. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Im., 126 Idaho 527,530,887 
P.2d 1034,1037 (1 994) (holding non-moving party is not required to respond to 
issues not raised by the moving party even if the non-moving party ultimately has 
the burden of proof at trial). 
The Court of Appeals recently reiterated the standard of review in a case to be tried to the 
court. In Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455,210 P.3d 563,566 (Ct App. 2009), the court 
stated: 
When a court considers a motion for summary judgment in a case that 
would be tried to a jury, all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M 
Farms, 119 Idaho at 517,808 P.2d at 854; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 
125 Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). The rule is different 
however when, as here, a jury trial has not been requested. In that event, because 
the court would be the fact-finder at trial, on a summary judgment motion the 
court is entitled to draw the most probable inferences from the undisputed 
evidence properly before it, and may grant the summary judgment despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences. P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucb Family 
Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,237, 159 P.3d 870,874 (2007); Intermountain 
Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana PaciJic Corp., 136 Idaho 233,235,31 P.3d 921, 
923 (2001); Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189,191,923 P.2d 434,436 (1996). 
Inferences thus drawn by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the record 
reasonably supports them. S M e r  v. Hucklebeny Estates, L. L. C., 140 Idaho 
354,360-61,93 P.3d 685,691-92 (2004); Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc., 136 
Idaho at 236,3 1 P.3d at 924. 
If the evidence shows no disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 
485,887 P.2d 29,30 (1994). 
B. The District Court did not Err in its Construction of the Irrigation District 
Domestie Water System Revenue Bond Act 
The trial court interpreted LC. tj 43-1909(e) consistent with the opinion in Loomis 
v. City ofHailey,l19 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991). In its analysis, the trial court observed 
that the statutory powers of an irrigation district granted pursuant to LC. $43-1909(e) were the 
same as those granted to municipalities pursuant to LC. $50-1030(f), which is part of the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act. R p. 142-143. 
On appeal, Viking contends that the trial court erred in determining that HLID had 
authority pursuant to LC. tj 43-1909(e) to collect a connection fee that included an equity buy-in 
for connection to its domestic water system in the absence of issuance of a revenue bond for 
acquisition or construction of that system. In support of its argument, Viking argues that the 
legislative history of the statutes and the language of the statutes composing, when read in parity, 
demonstrate that issuance of a revenue bond was intended to be a condition precedent to 
utiliition of the provisions of the Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act 
(I. C. tjtj43-1906 - 1920.) 
Viking contends construction of the Act as a whole supports its position, correctly noting: 
"In construing a statute, this Court will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but 
will ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act 
and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions." George K Watkins 
Family v. Messenger, 11 8 Idaho 537,539-40,797 P.2d 1385,1387-88 (1990). 
In reaching its conclusion, V i g  fails to look at the act as a whole, and instead focuses 
on only a portion of the fiscal impact statement for Bill H 676 and the House Local Government 
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Committee Minutes of February 24, 1988. V i g  alleges that those minutes provided that the 
proposal would give irrigation districts the ability to issue revenue bonds and that the bonds 
would be repaid by system users. V i g  concludes that the fiscal impact statements 
demonstrates that the trial court misconstrued LC. $ 43-1909(e) because it supports its contention 
that the legislature intended issuance of bonds for revenue as a condition precedent to the 
authority granted for collection of rates, fees, tolls or charges allowed by LC. $ 43-1909(e). 
Viking's argument in fact ignores the provisions of the Act as a whole and narrowly 
focuses on only those provisions related to revenue bond financing. When the legislature added 
the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, LC. $43-1907 it provided that irrigation districts were to operate 
all such works for the use and benefit of those served by the works. Further, Irrigation districts 
were to strive for the promotion of the welfare and improvement of the health, safety, comfort 
and convenience of the inhabitants of its district. It also required any irrigation district acquiring, 
c o ~ c t i n g ,  reconstructing, improving, bettering of, and extending any works pursuant to the 
act to do so in the most efficient manner consistent with sound economy and public advantage. 
Most importantly, it did not require an irrigation district to issue revenue bonds when exercising 
any grant of authority under the Act. 
In order to accomplish the task of providing water to the members of those served by the 
works, Idaho Code $43-1909 granted and defines specific powers to an irrigation district. 
Nothing contained therein conditions exercise of the grant of power upon the issuance of revenue 
bonds. Further, if one were to follow V i g ' s  logic, to operate and maintain a water system 
acquired by gift, the members would be required to issue a revenue bond to operate and maintain 
it. Similarly, to operate a water system which pre-dated the statute, an irrigation district would 
be required to issue revenue bonds before it could collect rates, tolls, fees or charges in 
connection with that water system. Nothing in the Act supports this contention. 
There are provisions in I.C. (j 49-1909 specific to issuing revenue bonds. One subsection 
allows an irrigation district to use revenue bonds to finance the acquisition, construction, 
r e c o ~ c t i o n ,  improvement, betterment or extension of any works. LC. tj 43-1909(d). Another 
subdivision of the statute provides for the irrigation district to pledge an amount of revenue from 
works sufficient to pay bonds and interest as the same becomes due. LC. $43-1909(f). 
Separate and apart from these powers in I.C. (j 43-1909 which specifically address 
revenue bonds, yet another subsection grants an irrigation district the power to prescribe and 
collect rates, fees, tolls or charges for the services, facilities and commodities furnished by the 
works namely LC. $43-1909(e). This subsection does not limit such fees to the amount needed 
to pay bonds. It does not require that revenue bonds be issued before its grant can is effective. 
Contrary to Viking's position, when this statutory provision is read as a whole, nothing therein 
supports the contention that the grant of power is subject to a condition that an irrigation district 
must have previously issued revenue bonds to utilize the authority granted therein. 
Other provisions of the Act require the water system to be self supporting. Idaho Code (j 
43-191 1 requires that fees be enough to cover the costs of bond repayment, operation expenses 
and maintenance. It also requires the district collect enough in fees to maintain a reserve for 
operation and maintenance. 
The provisions of the Act read as a whole do not support V i g ' s  claim that the 
legislature intended to require issuance of a revenue bond as a condition precedent to an 
irrigation district collecting fees. 
C. The District Court did not Err in Holdmg that Connection Fees are 
Permissible as Long as such Fees Conform to the Statutory Scheme Set Forth 
in the Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act 
The powers of HLID granted pursuant to LC. (j 43-1909(e) are the same as those granted 
to municipalities pursuant to LC. $50-1030(f). The powers granted by the legislature pursuant 
to LC. 4 50-1030(f) were analyzed in the context of a municipality in Loomis v. City of Hailey, 
119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991). Therein, this Court addressed many of the arguments 
raised by Viking in this matter. 
This Court commenced its analysis in Loomis v. City of Hailey, supra, by disposing of the 
argument that a sewer connection fee was a tax. The Court noted that there was a difference 
between a municipality's exercise of its police powers and its proprietary functions. This Court 
recognized that when acting under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act (I.C. $50-1027 - LC. 50- 
1042) that the city was exercising its proprietary functions. The Supreme Court held that a city 
derived its authority to charge water and sewer connection fees pursuant to the Idaho Revenue 
Bond Act and since the charge related to exercise of a proprietary function, the charge was not a 
tax. The court explicitly held that the Idaho Revenue Bond Act authorized the collection of 
sewer connection fees and as long as the fees were allocated and budgeted in conformity with 
that Act they would not be construed as taxes. The Supreme Court concluded that when the 
rates, fees and charges conformed to the statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho Revenue Bond 
Act were imposed pursuant to a valid police power, the charges were not construed as taxes. 
V i g  argues that the trial court's interpretation of LC. 4 49-1909(e) by extension of the 
Loomis'court's analysis nullities LC. 4 43-1914. Viking argues that by allowing an irrigation 
district to collect money for an equity buy-in to the water system through a connection fee, an 
irrigation district will never have to resort to revenue bonds because it will use its connection 
fees to acquire and construct works. This argument completely ignores the F i t s  imposed on the 
district regarding the collection of fees as enunciated in Loomis v. City of Hailey, supra. The 
fees may not be collected as general revenue. However, they may be collected when they 
represent an equity buy-in to the water system. 
The trial court observed the Loomis required, as a first step in the analysis, a 
determination of whether the connection fee constituted an impermissible tax. The trial court 
observed that so long as the fees collected pursuant to the Act were allocated and budgeted in 
conformity with the Act, they would not be construed as taxes. However, if fees were collected 
under the Act, but were allocated and spent otherwise, then the fees were primarily revenue 
raising and would be construed as taxes. R p. 143. 
The trial court's holding in the present case is proper for two reasons. First, it correctly 
interprets Loomis' construction of LC. 6 43-1914, and 649-1909. Second, the trial court's 
holding prevents any nullification of LC. 6 43-1914 as argued by Viking. 
D. The District Court did not Err in Holding that HLID's Connection Fee was 
Permissible Based Upon its Allocation and Budgeting 
V i g  implicitly and expressly argues in different portions of its appeal brief that the 
trial court erred in determining that HLID's connection fee was permissible and not a tax. 
Viking claims the connection fees were not properly allocated or budgeted under the Act. Both 
of these arguments will be addressed herein. 
The implicit argument, not expressly enunciated in Viking's argument, is the concept that 
the legislative history establishes that HLID's connection fee was collected for future expansion 
to the system in violation of the parameters of Loomis v. City of Hailey. 
V i g  notes in its argument on appeal that in 1988, Representative Giovanelli explained 
the bill for the Act was needed to address specific problems in the Hayden Lake area Viking 
notes that Sheryl Chapman stated to the Resources and Conservation Committee that a 
borrowing privilege would help small domestic water companies upgrade their systems to meet 
forthcoming stringent government standards. Without any facts to support its position, Viking 
speculates that the problems in the Hayden Lake area were those of HLID and lead to the 
passage of the Act (even though there are two other irrigation districts in the Hayden Lake area, 
and several small domestic water companies). 
Viking then proceeds to discuss HLID Resolution No. 01-014, which was a proposal for a 
revenue bond to fund an expansion of the system by addition of a water storage tank. V i g  
concludes that even though HLID did not proceed with the project, collection of hook-on fees 
continued, thus implying that the fees were being collected for future funding of the water 
storage tank discussed in the resolution. The bond proposal was for a new water tower to 
provide additional fire flow volumes to the members of the district. After several public hearings 
and review by a member committee, the Board did not go forward with a bond election. R p. 95, 
Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr VoL. I., p. 10, L. 11-14. In fact, a later advisory 
committee recommended against considering the tower as an option for the district. R p. 95, 
Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 108. 
More importantly, the financing options for the water storage tank that were discussed 
and considered were independent and unrelated to the hook-up fees charged by HLID. This 
independence is demonstrated by the rate committee recommendations to the Board in 2001. 
The rate committee recommended the Board seek a 1.5 million dollar bond levy in November 
2001 for building the water storage tank. It W e r  revealed that if that bond failed, the Board 
should set up a capital expenditure reserve fund dedicated to financing the tower and funded by 
an assessment rate increase to all users. Independent of the tower construction, the rate 
committee made a separate rate increase recommendation of domestic hook-up fees of $2,500. R 
p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit "A", p. 41. The hook-up fee was not discussed or considered as 
part of the recommended dedicated capital expenditure reserve for financing the water storage 
tank 
As of the date of this suit, assessment rates had increased significantly. These rates were 
used to pay for some of the improvements which had been contemplated in the 2001 bond levy 
unrelated to the water storage tank Other improvements still have not been performed. R p. 95, 
Rose Affidavit Exhibit E3, Rohrbach Dep. Tr VoL. 11, p. 90, L. 10-25; p. 91, L. 1-22. Thus, 
there is nothing in the record to support Viking's unfounded argument that the connection fees 
were being collected for the water storage tank discussed in the resolution or to address concerns 
discussed by legislatures in 1988. 
Viking also explicitly argues that the trial court erred in holding that the connection fee 
was not a tax because it was collected pursuant to the Irrigation District Domestic Water System 
Revenue Act, and was not collected for revenue purposes. Viking argues the record 
demonstrates that the fees were collected for the purpose of raising revenues for future capital 
assets and future improvements required due to population growth, and not as an equity buy-in 
into the water system. 
V i g  took the deposition of HLID's chairman, Bert Rohrbach, on June 6,2006 (R p. 
95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol I) and again on September 21,2007 (R p. 
95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E3, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol 11). Viking cites to testimony from the 
second deposition that the hook-on fees were to pay for future capital assets and future 
improvements due to population growth, and concludes that was the primary purpose of the hook 
on fee. This claim is not a fair representation of the testimony cited. Within the context of this 
specific portion of testimony, h4r. Rohrbach disagreed with Viking's conclusion that the reason 
for the September 8,2007 hook-on fee increase was because the board desired development to 
pay a bigger portion of the future needs of capital assets. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E3, 
Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. 11, p. 13, L. 18-22. He further testified there had been failures in the 
control system and some equipment was simply worn out, and the demands of new growth or 
additional connections had brought the control system to the end of its design life and capacity. 
Mr. Rohrbach then referred V i g  back to his previous testimony for a complete explanation for 
the hook-up fee and elements that went into its establishment. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit 
E3, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. 11, p. 13, L.. 24-25; p. 14, L. 1-9. Thus, to take this testimony in 
context, one must look at the previous testimony. 
In the first deposition, Mr. Rohrbach testified that connection fees included an equity 
buy-in to the system, historically known as a "tap-on fee" and some remuneration for the cost of 
the meter. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 16-25; p. 28, 
L. 1-61 p. 30, L. 10-14; p. 33, L. 20-25; p. 34, L. 1-2. Mr. Rohrbach testified that the advisory 
committee that looked at hook up fees was primarily concerned with the current equity value for 
buying into the system, and not payment for future growth. Rose Affidavit R p. 95, Rose 
Affidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr p. 65, L. 3-5; p. 66, L. 9-12,20-21. The board 
understood that equity buy-in was compensation for those devices, appurtenances, inf%astructure, 
backbone, pumps, tanks, and such as necessary to deliver water to the members that had been 
supported and maintained or kept operational for 50 plus years. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit 
E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. I, p. 71, L. 8-1 7. The board considered the age and condition of the 
idmsfmcture in setting the fee. R p. 95, Rose Af3davit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. I, p. 
82, L. 1-5. In addressing the use of revenue from hook on fees, Mr. Rohrbach testified: 
Q. Okay. How are the -or how is the revenue generated from hookup 
fees utilized in the overall operating scheme of the district? 
A. The board makes an effort to utilize those fees specifically to 
maintain service, keep functional a 50-year-old system that is fraught with 
numerous operational difficulties. They always try to utilize those fees as they 
maintain and try to keep that antiquated backbone alive, to provide upgrades or 
supplemental repairs or services to it that will keep it viable for additional years, 
rather than having to go defunct or non-operational. On a case-by-case basis, that 
can involve a variety of techniques or approaches. 
R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. I, p. 86, L. 2-14. 
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The testimony of Mr. Rohrbach further verified the money was not used to subsidize daily 
operations to avoid an increase in assessment rates for operation and maintenance of the system. 
R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E3, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. p. 92,ll-24-25; p. 93, L. 1-8. 
During Mr. Rohrbach's deposition, V i g ' s  counsel indicated that the accountant had 
defined certain terms used in the audit report and incorporated those definition to be used in 
answer to his questions. Counsel indicated the accountant referenced an "improvement" as being 
an item that extended the life but not breadth of the system. Mr. Rohrbach agreed to utilize this 
definition of "improvement" as extended by counsel, specifically when answering questions 
about the use of connection fees. Mr. Rohrbach declined however, to use the definition of a 
capital asset as an asset that expanded capacity. Mr. Rohrbach indicated he understood a capital 
asset to be a future asset. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E3, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. I, pp. 86- 
87; 88, L. 1-15. V i g  then proceeded to inquire if the Board had set aside hookup fees, net of a 
charge for meters, to fund planned future water system improvements. Mr. Rohrbach indicated 
that it had. R p. 95, Rose A£fidavit Exhibit E3, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. I, p. 92, L. 8-13. 
V i g s  now claims testimony regarding use of the fees for "improvements" 
demonstrates that the hook up fee was collected as a revenue source for future capital assets and 
future improvements required due to population growth in violation of Loomis v. Hailey, supra. 
However, when this testimony is considered in context of the definition V i g  indicated it was 
using in asking questions about "improvements" during the deposition, which definition was 
akin to repair and replacement of system components, and surroundi~lg testimony in Mr. 
Rohrbach's deposition, this claim is without merit. Mr. Rohrbach was not testifying that the 
hook up fees were intended to fund improvements and capital assets that were not current system 
components in violation of the holding of Loomis v. City of Haiiey, supra. Rather, using the 
definition given to him by V i g  he meant the funds were to replace existing system 
components. 
This intent is clear in the later testimony of Mr. Rohrbach. When asked how the board 
intended to expend the revenue from hook-on fees, Mr. Rohrbach stated that as the system aged 
and needed additional replacement it would use the hook-on fees for such replacements. 
AfKdavit R p. 95, Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol.. I, p. 96, L. 1-15. Viking then inquired 
whether Mr. Rohbach's concept of replacement included expansion of the system. The response 
was clear it did not as demonstrated in the following question and answer: 
Q. You just mentioned the word "replacement." And I appreciate 
that. Is it also witbin the board's thinking, as you understand it, for expansion 
purposes? 
A. The board typically, at least at a philosophical level, does not look 
at expansion for those funds. Expansion is usually related to domestic or 
residential development, and that is addressed though development agreements 
as a separate instnunent. If1 were to use "replacement," it would be more along 
the lines of your analogy of an improvement, when you replace the engine, you 
allow it another life, a second life, so the replacement of a water l i e  in the 
infrastructure, perhaps at a slightly different location to improve efficiency, would 
be along the lines that I would utilize that. 
Rose Aadavit R p. 95, Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol.. I, p. 97, L. 1-15. 
Thus, the evidence in the record was that the hook-up fees were used for system component 
replacement. 
Viking argues that there are other facts in the record that demonstrate that the hook-up 
fees were utilized for purposes other than system component replacement. Viking claims the 
testimony of Cathy Meyers demonstrates that the hook-up fees were ear marked for system 
improvements rather than for repair and replacement of existing system components. 
Ms. Meyer's is an independent certified public accountant, who has been engaged by 
HLID's Board of Directors to audit the district's books to assure conformity with Government 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) standards. The purpose of the audit was to provide 
14 
reasonable assurance to the Board and the members of the irrigation district that the financial 
statements of HLID were without material misrepresentation. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E 
1, Meyer Dep. Tr, p. 6, L. 22-25, p. 7, L. 1-11.) 
In the course of her audits, in 2003, Ms. Meyers made a recommendation that the District 
set a capitalization policy. However, the term as she used it, was unrelated to a connection fee 
policy. Rather, it related to when to book an asset and track depreciation. R p. 95, Rose 
Affidavit Exhibit El, Meycr Dep. Tr p. 13-20. Ms. Meyers clarified at deposition her use of the 
word "improvement" in her parlance, was something that extended the life of an asset, but did 
not expand its breadth. Her example of an improvement was placing a new engine in a vehicle 
to extend its life. Rose Affidavit, Exhibit El, Meyer Deposition, p. 31, L. 7-13. In the rubric of 
Loomis v. City of Hailey, supra, this example would be a replacement of a system component. 
Thus, Vikiog's innuendo that the accountant's audit revealed the funds were set aside in a 
separate account for future system improvements, rather than repair or replacement of system 
components, is not supported by the actual testimony. In fact, the actual testimony of the auditor 
reveals that the auditor's understanding of the use of the funds resulting from the audit was that 
they would be used for repair and replacement of system components. 
Viking also contends the record shows that the hook-on fees were increased by five 
percent (5%) out of concern for future capital improvement expenditures. R p. 25, Rose 
Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 11 1. This exhibit is a portion of minutes from HLID's September 16, 
2003 regular meeting. The item cited to by Viking is a discussion of the assessment levy being 
increased for this purpose, and not the connection fee. In fact, this evidence is contrary to 
Viking's position. This evidence shows that the district was setting side capital improvement 
reserves from its assessments, and not &om the connection fees. 
V i g  also claims that HLID Resolution No. 04-09, dated August 3,2004, creating a 
dedicated fund for upgrading the size of a water service l i e ,  shows hook up fees were being 
used for improvements to the system. This resolution recognizes that an upgrade to the size of 
the line will be required in the future and is not due to any individual project. It establishes a 
dedicated fund for deposit of money collected pursuant to future development agreements for the 
purpose of the upgrade. It also indicates that the capitalization and hook-on fees collected from 
members in the identified service area may be transferred at the Board's discretion to the 
dedicated fund. R p, 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 128. However, nothing in the resolution 
indicates that the Board will abandon the parameters that it recognized in the use of hook-up 
fees. Viking has presented no evidence in the record that the Board has ever transferred any 
money from hook-on fees to this fund in violation of loomis. 
Viking further claims the purchase of the SCADA system with connection fees violated 
the parameters of Loomis v. Hailey. V i g  claims this purchase was a capital improvement due 
to language used by Ms. Meyer in the audit wherein she referenced it as an improvement. As 
discussed previously, Ms. Meyer did not use the term to mean an upgrade to the system or 
expansion of capacity. Rather, when she used it in her audit, it reflected a replacement of a 
system component. The only planned expenditures of the connection fees testified to by Meyers 
was replacement of existing water lines and the costs associated with installation of a SCADA 
system. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Deposition, p. 49, L. 4-14. 
Contrary to V i g ' s  unsupported position that the SCADA system was an expansion of 
the system, in fact, SCADA replaced a failing system component of the existing water tower 
facility. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 113 (advisory committee recommendation that 
Board acquire SCADA system to replace existing controller system on reservoir); R p. 95, Rose 
Affidavit Exhibit E3, Robrbach Deposition Tr Vol. II, p. 51, L. 20-25; p. 52, L. 1-21 (Rohrbach's 
testimony that SCADA replaced a failed control component in the system.) It added no capacity 
to the system and was not an expansion. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E3, Rohrbach 
Deposition Tr Vol. 11, p. 94, L. 3-12. Yet another transfer of money &om this system shown in 
the record was that NLID transferred an amount to reimburse the general fund for amounts 
expended for the meter sets. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 72. 
V i g  contends the district court also erred in concluding that the hook up fees net of 
meter costs were set aside in a separate, non-general fund account, with the state treasurer. 
Viking contends Ms. Meyer's deposition substantiates this position. Viking cites to the record at 
pages 42 and 43 of Ms. Meyers deposition, and concerns testimony that since 2002 hook-on fees 
have been physically deposited in an Idaho local government investment pool account and 
accounted for in HLID's accounting system as a separate account labeled "1014 - State 
Treasurer Invest Pool". Exhibits 12,13 and 14 to Ms. Meyer's deposition discussed during this 
inquiry supports this testimony, showing the general fund deposited with Mountain West Bank 
and separately accounted for &om the hook-up fees in the state pool account. 
Viking also cites to pages 61 through 68 of Ms. Meyer's testimony, wherein she 
discusses the accounting for assessment revenues in the general fund and transfers to the general 
fund of hook-on fees. Ms. Meyer testified that when there is money taken &om the state pool 
fund, a record is maintained by staff. R p. 95, L. 9-13, p. 67, L. 17-21. 
V i g  claims HLID impermissibly commingled funds in its general fund with 
assessments and tract fees and this violated the Act. It also contends that HLID did not know 
how or on what it spent hook-on revenues. In support of this assertion, Viking points to Ms. 
Meyer's deposition testimony, and claims due to comminglii she was unable to determine the 
source of the payment for expenses during her audit. However, Ms. Meyer's testimony was not 
as represented by Viking. Ms. Meyer was asked whether she could tell whether any assessment 
generated revenue was spent on capital improvements. Ms. Meyers testified she could not 
because when she looked at an accrual based expenditure on a h c i a l  statement she did not 
necessarily look at what pot of money it came out of. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit, Exhibit El, Meyer 
Dep. Tr p. 65, L. 16-25, p. 66, L. 1-3. Ms. Meyer testified as part of the audit she had not done a 
tracing of the funds used to buy tixed asset expenditures to determine which pot of money paid 
for it which was why she could not determine the source of payments for h e d  assets. However, 
nothing came to her attention in the audit that money was being txansfened out to pay bills such 
as the phone bill with the hook-up fee monies. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit El, p. 72, L. 18- 
25; p. 73, p. 74, L. 1-9. 
Following this testimony, Viking asked: 
Q. And do you know whether or not the Hayden Lake irrigation District does a 
bookkeeping record of what the money is spent on from each of those revenue 
sources? 
A. It's my understanding that they do, yes. 
R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Dep. Tr, p. 66, L. 4-8. 
In discussions on the record after this testimony, Viking's counsel indicated for future references 
he was going to call the bookkeeping record the "management report on assessment revenue 
expenditures" at which point Ms. Meyer interrupted and informed Viking's counsel that the 
name being provided did not characterize what she was describing because what was maintained 
by HLID was an accounting of expenditure of hookup fees, not assessments. R p. 95, Rose 
Affidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Dep. Tr, p. 66, L. 14-25; p. 67. 
Viking cites to the testimony of Mr. Rohrbach in support of its claim that HLID 
commingled its hook up funds with the general funds and paid all expenses without further 
authority. However, Mr. Rohrbach did not testify there was commingliing. The question posed 
to him was whether the hook-up fee provided surplus funds that could be applied to other needs 
of the district. After objection to the form of the question, Mr. Rohrbach testified that it did 
provide funds that were placed into the general fund to be utilized as the board deemed fit. 
However, he was not asked to specify at what point in time the funds were transferred as 
revenues to the general fund, and he certainly did not testify there was a general commingling of 
the funds. 
In fact, Ms. Meyer testified that in 2002 the Board began physically depositing the 
connection fees in a separate bank account with the state treasurer, net of the meter charge, for 
water system improvements. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Deposition Tr, p. 40, L. 
1-14, p. 41, L. 1-17. The tracking of the hook up fees on HLID's books is through an account 
labeled "1014 - State Treasurer's Invest Pool" to which hook-up fees were deposited. R p. 95, 
Rose Affidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Dep. Tr Exhibits 12,13, and 14. Prior to 2002, the hook up 
fees were deposited in HLID's only checking account but accounted for separately on the books 
as a revenue account labeled "capital fund," and not in the general fund. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit 
Exhibit El, Meyer Dep. Tr p. 82, L. 8-25, Deposition Exhibit 18. When money is expended 
from the 1014 account, it is transferred to HLID's checking account, which is the only checking 
account for HLID. A transfer is made on the books to show the transfer of the money to the 
general fund to pay the expense. Rose Affidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Dep. Tr p. 64, L. 21-25; p. 
65, L. 1-15. Some of the money has been kept in the checking account, but was still separately 
accounted apart from general fund revenues. Rose Affidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Dep. Tr p. 42, L. 
8-17. V i g  claims Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 to Ms. Meyers deposition demonstrate there was no 
separate accounting. However, the schedules clearly show "account 1014 - State Treasurer's 
Investment Pool" as a separate line item account as testified to by Ms. Meyer. 
Although the years prior to 2002 are irrelevant to the inquiry, it is undisputed that all 
money collected by the district was placed in its checking account. However, this is not the 
same as impermissibly comming1'ing the funds. Viking fails to appreciate the diierence between 
separate accounts on the books of HLID and a separate bank account. Viking contends because 
the money was in one bank account that it was all comingled in the general fund. This position 
is an accounting fallacy. As testified to by Ms. Meyer, the money was accounted for in a 
separate designated fund that wasn't the general fund. 
E. The District Court did not Err in Holding that the Connection Fee was 
Appropriately and Reasonably Assessed 
V i g  maintains that the District Court erred in rejecting its argument that the equity 
buy-in had to be derived from a formula prepared by an accountant or an engineer. R p. 147. 
V i g  argues that the Revenue Bonding Act (interpreted in Loomis) and the Irrigation District 
Domestic Water Revenue Act both require engineer determined plans and calculations to avoid a 
finding that the buy-in fee determination is arbitrary. The Loomis court held that the legislature 
had not imposed exacting rate requirements, but rather required fees be reasonably related to the 
benefit conveyed. Loomis at 442. The Loomis court cited with approval Meglino v. Township 
Committee of Eagleswood 103 N.J. 144,510 A.2d 1134 (1986), wherein the New Jersey 
Supreme Court upheld a sewer connection charge which required new users to pay a 
proportionate share of the ori@ construction cost required by prior connectors, holding that 
"there may be any number of ways in which computation of a fair share can be fixed" and 
"regardless of what method of financing is chosen, equality of treatment is obviously the 
polestar." Loomis at 442. 
Contrary to Viking" position that Loomis stands for the proposition that an engineer or 
accountant's study is required to implement a buy-in amount, the New Jersey case was again 
cited with approval for its holding that "[tlhis Court has never imposed on municipalities an 
orthodoxy of ratemaking." Loomis at 442. 
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Viking argues other factors present in this case demonstrate that the fee was arbitrary. 
Viking argues that the board failed to seek engineer plans, engineer cost estimates, project 
identification, or an amount necessary to pay the cost of the works, thereby making any decision 
arbitrary. Viking also argues that the board did not engage an engineer or accountant to value 
the system's capital assets, thereby causing the buy-in calculation to be arbitrary. V i  argues 
that the advisory committee met only once, thus demonstrating its decision and analysis were 
impulsive i.e, not reasonably recommended. Viking maintains a review of equity buy-in of 
comparable systems in the community by the advisory committee was inappropriate and 
unreasonable. Finally, Viking concludes that the rate comparison and fee recommendation 
provided to the Board by the advisory committee demonstrates it was solely based upon looking 
at other local systems. 
Viking contends on appeal that the board never attempted to determine the depreciated 
value of its system, and therefore could not have determined an equity value of the system. 
Viking provides no cites to the record to support its position. Regarding valuation of capital 
assets, the record clearly shows that HLID obtained an independent auditor's report annually. 
HtID's auditor, Cathy Meyer testified that McCall and Landwehr had been doing the audit since 
2000. R p.95, Rose Aftidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Dep. Tr p. 41, L. 19-25. Further, the annual 
audit consistently included the depreciated value of the capital assets of the system. R p. 95, 
Rose Affidavit, Exhibit B, 2003 audit page 6; 2004 audit, note 3 (showing wells and 
improvements as of October 1,2003 with a net book value of $465,002 after deduction of 
accumulated depreciation and the water distribution system with a net book value of $724,406 
after deduction of accumulated deprecation); 2005 audit, p. 8, note 3 (showing wells and 
improvements as of September 30,2005 with a net book value of $1,087,360 after deduction of 
accumulated depreciation and the water distribution system with a net book value of $3,306,391 
after deduction of accumulated depreciation); 2006 audit, p. 12, note 3 (showing wells and 
improvements as of September 30,2006 with a net book value of $1,059,196 after deduction of 
accumulated depreciation and the water and irrigation system with a net value of $4,525,773 
after deduction of accumulated depreciation). 
Even though V i g  argues the District had no information fiom which it could 
determine the value of its system, V i g  recognizes on appeal that the district tracked its 
depreciated value of assets through its audits. V i g  contends it paid more in hook up fees than 
the depreciated value of the system. F i  there are no facts in the record to support V i g ' s  
claim that it paid 65 hookup fees. Second, Viking claims the record reflects that HLID's 
depreciated value system at the end of the fiscal year on September 30,2004, was $27,191 is 
wrong. To supports its conclusion, Viking cites to Exhibit 11 of Ms. Meyer's deposition. R p. 
95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit El, Exhibit 11. 
Viking has misperceived the information contained on this accounting report. Exhibit 1 1 
is a depreciation schedule for 2003 for the various assets of the district. The first page of the 
exhibit contains a depreciation account labeled "1465 Wells and Improvements." A summary of 
the columns containing figures for this asset greater than zero read as follows: 
Cost1 Depr. Prior Current 
&& &i!& &r &r 
V i g  m a i n k  this sheet indicates that the value of the wells as of September 30,2004 was 
$27,191. However, this figure is contained in the column for "current depreciation" for the year. 
To anive at the proper depreciated figure, one would begin with the depreciation basis value and 
subtract prior and current depreciation from it. The resulting net figure is $444,417 for only the 
wells and improvements to the wells. This figure does not even address the depreciated value of 
the water distribution system (pipes and infktmcture used for delivery of water) contained in 
this exhibit. This component is the larger value of the system. Thus, V i g ' s  argument that all 
of the connection fees are going toward buying a system worth only $27,191 is not supported by 
the facts in the record. 
V i g  also argues intuitively that "future needs for money to replace or repair resonates 
with a decreased equity value and a decreased buy-in amount." There are no cites to the record 
to support this argument. This premise might hold tme if the system were W i g  allowed to go 
defunct without repair, replacement or additions to assets. However, the facts in the record show 
that HLID was repairing the system, and that developer's were adding value to the system 
through development. Ms. Meyer's testimony indicated that a we11 that was acquired by the 
District in 2004 was exchanged to the District in lieu of payment of a dry land conversion fee 
owed to the District by a developer pursuant to a development agreement R p. 95, Rose 
Affidavit Exhibit El, Meyer Deposition, p. 43, L. 15-25; p. 44, L. 1-21. Ms. Meyers also 
testified that the District had acquired significant hfrastmcture valued in excess of $100,000 
pursuant to development agreements with developers. However, she was clear there was no 
actual expense to the District related to these acquisitions, because they were transfers to the 
District by developers pursuant to development agreements. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit, Exhibit El, 
Meyer Deposition, p. 45, L. 11-25, p. 46, L. 11-25, p. 47, L. 1-1 1. In 2004, there were capital 
contributions by developers which increased the assets of the District. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit, 
Exhibit El, Meyer Deposition, p. 80, L. 25, p. 26, L. 1-5. The audit for 2004 shows that well and 
water system assets increased to slightly over $360,000. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit, Exhibit B2, 
2003-2004 audit Note 3. 
Viking argues that the advisory committee met only once, thus demonstrating its decision 
and analysis on fees was impulsive, and implying it was therefore unreasonable for the Board to 
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give weight to the advisory committee's input.' The facts in the record show that a citizen's 
advisory committee was established in April 2003 and five members appointed. R p. 95, Rose 
Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 103-104. The rates were discussed throughout the summer, including 
with the advisory committee. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. I, p. 
79, L. 24-24; p. 80, L. 1-7. The advisory committee made written recommendations to the board 
on July 6,2004. R p.95, Rose Aftidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol. I, p. 55. On August 
3,2004, the connection fee was on the agenda Advisory committee member Mike Saccone 
addressed the board and shared his thoughts on this topic. R p.95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 
127. The discussion of connection fees was tabIed to the next meeting. On August 17,2004, the 
connect fee agenda item was again tabled to allow for a workshop on the connect fees with the 
Board of Directors and the advisory committee. On September 1,2004, an advisory committee 
meeting was held, with all five advisory members present, including Mike Saccone, and the 
chairman of the Board. The meeting lasted approximately 2 hours. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit 
Exhibit A, p. 133. 
The key motivation for raising the hook-up fee discussed at the September 1, 
2004advisory committee meeting was current equity value for buy-in. The phrase "equity buy- 
in" was specifically used at the meeting. R p. 25, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr 
Vol. I, p. 66, L. 5-22. The discussion centered around the concept that compensation was 
required for devices, appurtenances, backbone, pumps, tanks and such as necessary to deliver 
water to the members for the existing system that had supported and maintained or kept 
operational for 50 plus years. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, Dep. Tr Vol. I, p. 71, L. 8-25; 
p. 72, L. 1. 
V i g  claims there was only one meeting where rates were discussed. The record actually shows there were other 
meetings. However, the only minutes included by V i g  in the record was for the advisory committee meeting on 
The advisory committee had the district engineer's water management plan at the 
meeting. Mr. Rohrbach testified: 
Q. Other than the document attached as page 2 to Exhibit 28, was there any other 
written materials that the advisory committee had at that meeting in front of it? 
A. As I recall, the water management plan was available at that meeting. 
Q. Was the water management plan reviewed at that meeting? 
A. I think it was referenced to. 
Q. In what way was it referenced? 
A. Discussion about the current state of the infrastructure and what the district 
engineer projected future needs and replacement repairs would be. 
R p.95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Dep. Tr Vol I, p. 75, L. 12-25. 
V i g  argues on appeal that this testimony demonstrates that the committee only "referenced" 
the document, but did not review or rely upon it. This argument is unpersuasive. There would 
be no reason for the advisory committee to reference these portions of the water management 
plan if it were not being considered in the decision being made. 
The record also shows the engineer discussed the equity value of the system in open 
discussion and workshops. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E3, Rohrbach Dep. Tr p. 24, L. 10- 
13. The open discussions occurred at public meetings, it took place among the advisory 
committee and it took place amongst the board itself in public deliberation. By the September 7, 
2004 meeting, there was a financial calculation of the equity value as of water system. It was not 
prepared by an accountant. It was anived at with input from the district's engineer, but was not 
prepared by the engineer. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit E3, Rohrback Dep. Tr Vol. II, p. 24, L. 
10-25; p. 25, L. 1-8. 
V i g  also contends it was unreasonable for the advisory committee to look at 
comparable systems and consider the value of comparable systems. V i g  cites to no authority 
for this proposition. This Court has consistently indicated it will not consider assignments of 
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Jorgenson v. Coppedge, - 
Idaho 181 P.3d 450 (2008). Further, since the concept is essentially one of a purchase price 
of the value of equity, inherently it does not make sense that a committee could not consider the 
purchase price for the purchases price of equity in comparable systems. 
On September 7,2004, the Board held its regular meeting. This meeting lasted a little 
over five hours. Almost four and half hours of the meeting was conducted outside of executive 
session. The minutes reflect that the connect fees were debated in length. Another 45 minutes 
was devoted to executive session matters, followed by a motion to hire an independent 
consultant to assist on specific projects. R p. 95, Rose Affidavit Exhibit A, p. 138-139. In 
comparison, the previous meeting of August 17,2004 only lasted half an hour. R p. 95, Rose 
AfEdavit Exhibit A p. 130. Following this lengthy meeting, the connection fee increase was 
adopted 
The trial court found that the District did not choose a number for the fee increase in a 
random manner. Instead, the Board reviewed and analyzed the issue, relying upon various 
figures and the needs of the system. The Board considered the current value of the existing 
system, the values and costs to purchase equity into comparable local water distribution systems, 
the water management plan of HLID with its infrastructure needs for maintenance, and the 
engineer's analysis regarding system repair and replacement. R p. 147 
F. Const Art. 8, jj 3 
At the District court level, Viking argued Article 8, § 3 applied in this case and prohibited 
the collection of a connection fee by an irrigation district. The trial court ruled against V i g  on 
thisissue. Rp. 134-135. 
On appeal, V i g  now argues that this constitutional provision the Revenue Bonding Act 
agrees with the trial court's ruling and raises for the first time argues Loomis is inapplicable to 
this case because the constitution component is absent in the passage of the act. 
In Loomis, this Court concluded that when the rates, fees and charges conformed to the 
statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act g were imposed pursuant to a valid 
police power, the charges were not construed as taxes. The fees in this case comply with the 
statutory scheme of the Act even though the Act does not stem fiom a constitutional provision. 
G. Charging a Connection Fee does not violate either the Carey Act or the 
Reclamation Act 
V i g  cites to the case of Zckes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82,95,57 S.Ct. 412,416-417 (1937) 
and Adams v. Twin Falls-Oakley Land & Wb-rer Co., 29 Idaho 357, I61 P. 322 (I 916) for the 
proposition that connection fees interfere with a landowner's appurtenant water rights by 
depriving access to water, and are therefore impermissible. These cases do not stand for this 
proposition. 
Zckes v. Fox, supra, held that when the federal government merely acted as the carrier and 
distributor of waters appropriated under the Reclamation Act to individual landowners, it did not 
gain any ownership rights in the appropriated water right, and such rights were wholly distinct 
fiom a property right in the irrigation works owned by the federal government. Extending that 
analysis to the present case, HLID is collecting a connection fee for connection to its water 
system, and not for utilization of the water held in trust for the members. 
V i g  also claims Adams v. Twin Falls-Oakley Land & Water Co., 29 Idaho 3547,161 
P. 322 (1916) supports its position. This case involved the homestead rights of an entryman. The 
defendant was a construction company which was deemed an operating company. It was not an 
irrigation district. The case involved the court's construction of a contract clause which provided 
that an entryman purchaser was not entitled to water from the operating company if he was in 
default under the payment terms of a contract for construction of irrigation facilities. The 
purchaser entryman claimed the contract clause was void as against public policy reasons and 
contrary to the entryman statutes, and that the defendant had to provide water to him. The 
Adurns court held that the entryman statutes limited the construction company's remedy in the 
event of default to filing a lien against the real property and foreclosing on it. 
This case does not address whether an irrigation district can charge a fee for connection 
to its domestic water system. Unlike Adurns v. Twin Falls-Oakley Land & Water Co, there is no 
statutory provision that limits the irrigation districts right to charge fees in connection with its 
domestic water system. To the contrary there is a statute that specifically allows it. 
Viking also a lengthy argument on why it perceives the payment of a connection 
fee as inequitable given the differences between municipal statutes and irrigation district statutes. 
However, V i g  provides no legal authority in support of its argument. This Court has 
consistently indicated it will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and 
authority in the opening brief. Jorgenson v. Coppedge, -Idaho -9 181 P.3d 450 (2008). 
Further, V i g ' s  argument is unpersuasive. Idaho Code 9 43-191 1 requires domestic 
water systems to be self supporting and allows reserves to be accumulated for maintenance and 
rehabilitation of the system. Section 43-1909(e) allows for collection of tolls, fees, rates and 
charges and allows for denial of service when such tolls, fees, rates and charges are not paid. It 
is clear that the legislature intended to allow the collection of fees as a condition to provision of 
domestic water. 
V i g  cites to Gedney v. Snake River Zrr. District, 61 Idaho 605, 104 P.2d 909 (1940) in 
its memorandum for the proposition that all fees and tolls must be proportional between 
members. Title 43, Chapter 19 was not a topic of discussion in Gedney. Rather, assessments for 
operation and maintenance of the irrigation system portion of the district was discussed and it 
was held that different assessments for maintenance and operation could not be charged to 
members even though the cost of transmission to some lands might be more expensive than 
others. The reason was that all properties received the same benefit irrigation. This holding does 
not guide or assist the court in the present case. The present case does not concern 
disproportionate operation and maintenance assessments based on proximity to water source. 
Rather, this case involves whether it is just and equitable to charge a connection fee to new 
members connecting to HLID's domestic water system, and the parameters of this connection fee 
as authorized by Title 43, Chapter 19. 
Finally, Viking claims the trial court erred by failing to construct all of the assessment 
provisions of Title 43 inpari materia, V i g  claims that all statues related to revenue, 
assessments and construction of works contained in Chapter 43 were inpari materia with the 
domestic water provisions because they involved construction of works, bonds as a revenue 
source, and assessments of operation and maintenance upon lands within the district In making 
this argument, the sections cited by Viking do not relate to the powers pursuant to which an 
irrigation district operates a domestic water system, and are unrelated to the purpose, duties or 
powers set forth in Title 43, Chapter 19. The only statutes which the trial court was required to 
read inpari materia with respect to this case were the statutes contained within Chapter 19, and 
the trial court did so. 
H. The Trial Court did not Err in its Analysis of the By-law Authority of 
Irrigation Districts as Provided by Statute 
On appeal, V i g  claims the trial court erred in holding that the by-laws were invalid. 
Viking contends that by-laws must address only the internal operation of the entity, and must be 
amended by the owners. This contention is contradicted by Viking's own authority. The 
definition of bylaw provided fhm Black's Law Dictionary is a "rule or administrative provision 
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adopted by an organization for its internal governance and its external dealings. " (Emphasis 
added.) 
V i g  takes issue with the fact that HLID's initial bylaws allowed for subsequent 
amendment by the board, and that the board has amended its by-laws from time to time since 
HLID's inception. V i g  claims that the legislature did not give imgation districts the authority 
to create "amendable by-laws." 
Idaho Code § 43-304 gives irrigation districts the power to establish equitable by-laws, 
rules, and regulations for the distribution and use of water among the owners of the land, as may 
be necessary and just to secure the just and proper distribution of water. Viking argues this 
provision does not give the board the power to amend the bylaws. According to V i g ,  the 
definition of the word "establish" according to Black's Law Dictionary is to settle, make or fix 
firmly; to enact permanently. Viking therefore concludes that the statute only allowed one initial 
set of by-laws be enacted by the board and once "established," be permanently fixed. 
This argument fails for several reasons. The word "establish" in the statute modified 
more than the bylaws. It also modified the rules and regulations. Therefore, under Viking's 
view, the legislative intent was that the Board could only ever enact one set of by-laws to govern 
the conduct of the affairs of the district and one set of rules and one set of regulations, that 
would forever regulate the business of the district. This contention is beyond ludicrous. It is 
apparent of the defmitions contained in Black's Law Dictionary, the one intended to be applied 
in this statute was to make or fix firmly. However, it was not to enact permanently. 
Next, the statue specifically addresses a member amendment to the by-laws in only two 
circumstances. The only requirements that members vote on a by-laws appear in LC. fi 43-1 1 1, 
which allows a 213 vote of the members to pass a by-law altering the code requirement that a 
voter live within the district to allow a voter to live within 15 miles of the district in order to be 
eligible to vote, and LC. § 43-201, which allows a 213 vote by members to pass a by-law altering 
the code requirement that a director live within the district to allow a director to serve if they live 
within 15 miles of the district. These are the only by-laws that the legislature expressly required 
members vote upon. 
F i l y ,  other than the two previously noted exceptions regarding member votes, there is 
no provision in the statute for subsequent amendments to by-laws. Thus, under Viking's 
proposed construction, the by-laws, rules and regulations would be static documents with only 
two narrow provisions subject to change in the bylaws throughout the years. There is nothing to 
indicate that the legislature intended an irrigation district to be an entity without the ability to 
adapt to change. 
A s s W g ,  arguendo, that V i g  is right that the fist  set of by-laws was the governing 
document for the internal affairs the district, the first set of by-laws avoided this conundrum by 
providing for future amendments to the document by the board. Viking denounces this provision 
as beiig in violation of the statute. However, nothing in the statute prevents a provision to 
address future amendments to the by-law. 
Viking also asserts that nothing in the statutory provision concerning by-laws allows for 
revenue generation being addressed therein. By the same token, nothing prohibits it either. 
Viking claims if one construes LC. 4 43-304 "internally consistent" with Title 43 that one 
must reach the conclusion the legislature did not intend to allow the board to include a provisions 
in the by-laws which resulted in revenue generation. V i g  argues the by-laws can't allow for 
collection of a tap-on fee because if revenue generation was expanded in the by-laws, it would 
circumvent express statutory provisions in the by-law that requires certain types of revenue 
generation be accomplished by means of bond issues. However, it is axiomatic that a by-law 
can't be inconsistent with a governing statute. If it is, it is void. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 163 
(2009). 
V i g  also claims in passing amendments to the by-laws that all boards after the initial 
board of directors committed ulfra vires acts. V i g  also claims it was an ultra vires act for the 
Board to include a provision regarding collection of connection fees within the by-laws. As 
previously argued, there is nothing in the statute that prohibited subsequent by-law amendments. 
Even if the statute was intended to be the permanent document, that bylaw itself allowed for 
subsequent amendments. Further, the provision was not in violation of statute. Chapter 43, Title 
19 allows for collection of connection fees. Thus, the by-law provision was not ultra vires. 
I. Constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection Rights 
On appeal, Viking raises due process in a different context than it did at the appellate 
level. Below, Viking argues the tap-on fee was increased without notice and opportunity to be 
heard in violation of due process. R p. 149. On appeal, V i g  argues it is the adoption of the 
by-law that violated its due process. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, as follows 
"nor all any State deprive any person of life, Iiberty, or property, without due process of Iaw, nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Notice and a hearing 
are required under the Fourteenth Amendment before such a deprivation of an individual's 
property take place. Fuentes v. Shein, 407 U.S. 67,92 S.Ct 1983,32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) R p. 
149. 
The trial court found that Viking had not identified any constitutionally protected right of 
which it was deprived. The trial court observed that the setting of rates and fees did not deprive 
any member of the right to receive water from HLID. R p. 149. 
Without any citation to facts on the record, V i g  claims on appeal that the inclusion of 
a tapon fee in the by-laws starting in 1947 deprived it of the use of the water appurtenant to its 
land. Also without support cited to in the record, Viking claims that it loss value from its lots and 
home due to money exacted as hook-on fees. Again, without citation to the record, Viking 
claims the change to the by-laws was done without providing adequate notice and an opportunity 
to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
V i g  claims the Board amends its by-laws on a whim. This claim is not supported by 
the record, which reflects by-laws are only amended after notice, and only in public hearing. R 
p. 94, Rose Affidavit Exhbit A, p. 71-71. Viking also maintains that ifthe directors are in 
agreement to amend there is not even prior notice to the board that the by-laws will be amended. 
It is hard to understand how there could be agreement without notice. Where Viking obtains its 
facts in making these assertions is a mystery. All business of the district is done at general 
meetings or special meetings. By-law changes were addressed at the general meetings. 
V i g  claims it suffered a deprivation of its substantive due process because it was 
subjected to arbitrary and unreasonable government action in that the equity buy-in was not 
prescribed by a formula As argued earlier, Viking's argument is without merit. The tap-on fee 
was amved at reasonably. 
Viking also claims an equal protection right violation. The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United State Constitution provides that the State shall not deprive any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This Court has provided a two-step process in an 
equal protection analysis. Tarbox v. Tax Corn 'n, 107 Idaho 957,959-960,695 P.2d 342,344- 
345, (1984). The first step is to identify the classification of the appellant. The second step is to 
determine the standard of review under which the classification should be judicially reviewed. 
Without citation to the record, V i g  claims it is the homeowner of several lots within 
the district. For the purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed to be true. Thus, the class in 
which V i g  would fall is new members seeking a first time connection to the domestic water 
system. 
Step two of the Tarbox procedure of equal protection evaluation is to assign what 
standard of judicial review the court must use. This Court found in General Telephone Co. of 
the Northwest, Znc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Corn'n 109 Idaho 942,945-946,712 P.2d 643,646- 
647 (1986) that great deference should be given to the state when setting telephone rates and by 
extension, fees such as the one at bar. The standard used in General Telephone was a rational 
basis test: did the state have a rational basis to take its action? i.e., raise the rates. 
V i g  argues this case is subject to strict s c ~ t i n y  because its fundamental right to own 
property is being burdened. Viking cites to no facts or case law to support this argument. The 
only argument V i g  can legitimately make is that it is required to pay a hook on fee to connect 
to the domestic water system, a portion of which represents a buy-in into the system. However, 
since 1947, all other users hooking into the domestic water system have also been required to 
pay this fee. Further, upon payment of this fee, Viking still has the right to receive domestic 
water. 
In the case at bar, HLID had a statutory obligation to operate the domestic water system 
for the use and benefit of those served by the works and for the promotion of the welfare and for 
the improvement of the health, safety, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the 
inigation district. LC. § 43-1907. It also had the obligation to have the works be self 
supporting, including collecting enough rates, tolls, fees and charges to pay operation and 
maintenance and accumulate reserves. LC. @43-1911; 1912. Clearly, HLID had a rational 
basis for its actions. 
V i g  also claims the board has a history of providing preferential treatment to some 
ratepayers , waiving assessment and hook-up fees capriciously. However, a true examination of 
the fact recited shows that the decisions were not arbitmy or capricious. 
Out of the voluminous documents reviewed by Viking, it has provided ten instances 
where it claims the board acted capriciously. In reaching this number, V i g  had to include 
assessment fees. The fitst instance was Friend's Churtch. As demonstrated in the record, this 
was an unusual circumstance where the property fell on the boundary of two irrigation districts, 
and due to confusion, the wrong imgation district ended up providing service. 
The second instance was that the District had determined to reimburse developers for 
hook up credits, but rescinded that decision. V i g  also takes issue that Delbert Kerr and John 
Sperle received waiver of hook-up fees when they installed infrastructure on behalf of the 
district. 
V i g  claims that a dedicated fund to assist developers, funded by some but not all 
developers, was established and funded by hook-up fees. This characterization is incorrect. A 
dedicated fund to be funded through development agreements was established, with the Board 
having discretion to transfer hook-up fees toward a line upgrade if it met the parameters allowed 
for hook-up fees. The record does not reflect any monies have gone into that account. 
Viking also claims a change in policy for handling multi-family dwellings was 
capricious. The district did nothing more change a policy to better address the needs of owners. 
Similarly, if one reads the other hook-up fee characterizations made by V i g  with the 
actual documents cited in the record, it is readily apparent that great liberties have been taken. 
The decisions were discussed in N 1  and were based upon sound policy reasons. They were not 
capricious. 
J. The Trial Court did not Err in Holding Idaho Constitution Article 15, gg 2, 
4 and 5 did not Apply to the Facts of the Case 
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Viking argued that Constitution Article 15,EjS 2,4, and 5 were violated by HLLD because 
it had interfered with Viking's constitutional right to access its share of the water rights held in 
trust for the members of the district. Although the trial court agreed these sections apply to 
irrigation districts, the trial court found that under the facts of the case, these sections did not 
apply to make HLID's action unconstitutional. R p. 139. V i g  appeals this decision. 
As a landowner within the District, V i g  claims the connection fee to hook into the 
domestic water system interferes with its constitutional right granted pursuant to Const. Art 15, 
$4 to obtain its share of the water right held in trust for the members. This constitutional section 
states that the entitlement to water is conditioned upon payment therefor, Viking contends that 
the payment is only for ordinary charges or assessment to cover the actual expenses incurred for 
the maintenance, operation and any other necessary expense incident to the delivery of water. 
In support of its position, V i g  cites to Ichs v. Fox, supra. As discussed previously, 
this case merely held that when the federal government acted as the carrier and distributor of 
waters appropriated under the Reclamation Act to individual landowners, it did not gain any 
ownership rights in the appropriated water right, and such rights were wholly distinct fkom a 
property right in the irrigation works owned by the federal government. It does not stand for the 
proposition that the payment provision is limited to exclude connection fees. 
Viking cites Adams v. Twin Falls-Oakley Land & Water Co., 29 Idaho 3547, 161 P. 322 
(1 9 16). This case involved the homestead rights of an entryman paying for authorized 
construction charges pursuant to the Carey Act, and the statutory provisions contained therein. It 
did not analyze Const. Art 15, Ej 4. The court evaluated the construction of a contract clause 
which provided that an entryman was not entitled to water fkom the operating company if he was 
in default under the contracts payment terms. The purchaser entryman claimed the contract 
clause was void as against public policy and contrary to the entryman statutes. The Adams court 
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held that the entryman statutes limited the construction company's remedy in the event of default 
to filing a lien against the real property and foreclosing on it. The case was speciftc to the rights 
of a settler of lands under the Carey Act statutes. It did not discuss the interpretation of this 
section of the constitution or any of the provisions of Title 43, Chapter 19 are unconstitutional. 
In the present case, the new members who wish to connect to the District's systems are 
not settlers of land under the Carey Act, nor are they existing members who have paid their 
annual assessment. This case simply does not stand for the proposition which V i g  contends it 
does. That contention being there is a statutory duty for an irrigation district to supply domestic 
water under the Carey Act to a new member if rentals and tolls (i.e. the assessment) are paid. In 
fact, LC. $43-1903 specifically allows for HLID to require payment of the connection fee in 
advance of water delivery. 
K The Trial Court did not Err in Holding Idaho Constitution Article 7, EjEj 2,5 
and 6 Were Not Violated 
When in front of the trial court, V i g  argued that HLID was required to pass an 
ordinance in order to increase its connection fee. R p. 136.011 appeal, V i g  argues that because 
the board of HLID is not invested with the power to tax by the legislature, the hook on fee 
violates Const. Art. 7, $6. V i g  also argues that the requirement for uniform taxation set forth 
in Const. Art 7,$ 5 and the requirement for proportionate taxing required in Art. 7, $ 2 is 
violated by HLID's connection fee. V i g  concludes that HLID is indirectly imposing a tax. 
V i g  claimed below that HLID violated Article XU, $ 2 of the Idaho constitution 
because the connection fee was unrelated to fee for regulation in connection with an exercise of a 
police power. This constitutional provision provides as follows: 
Article XII. Corporations, Municipal 
$2.  Local police regulations authorized 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, 
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all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its 
charter or with the general laws. 
The argument that fee increases require an ordinance pursuant to this constitutional 
provision was specifically rejected in Snake River Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Caldwell, 101 
Idaho 47,607 P.2d 1321 (1980). 
More importantly, this constitutional provision applies only to counties or incorporated 
cities or towns. By its terms, it does not apply to irrigation districts. Thus, the power of an 
irrigation district to impose connection fees is not derived from this provision of the constitution, 
even though irrigation districts have been deemed to have police powers pursuant to its statutes. 
Indian Cove Irrigation Dist. v. Pridequax,25 Idaho 112, 136 P. 618 (1913). The trial court did 
not err when it determined that this constitutional provision did not apply, and the issue was 
whether HLID had complied with the Act. R p. 137. 
The trial court rejected that Art 7, § 6 of Idaho Constitution was violated by HLID's fee 
increase. The trial court began its analysis with a recognition that this constitutional provision 
does apply to irrigation districts, citing to Oregon S.L.R.R v. Pioneer Irrigation Dist., 16 Idaho 
578,102 P. 904 (1909). The trial court also noted this is a provision that empowers irrigation 
district to collect taxes. R p. 138. 
The trail court rejected Viking's argument that this clause was violated, noting that the 
charge was properly collected pursuant to the Act and the parameters set forth in Loomis, supra. 
Since the fee was collected pursuant to statutory authority, it was not a tax. 
M. The Trial Court did not Err in its Anabsis of the Bureau of Reclamation 
Contracts 
Viking claims the trial court's findings were not supported by the record. Viking attacks 
specific findings as not being contained in the record before the trial court. These criticisms are 
without. The trial court found that the last contract with the Bureau was entered into in 1977. R 
p. 150. This finding is supported in the record R p. 94, Rose Aff, Exhibit C4. The trial court 
found that the wells and their infktructure, which are now the sole sources of water to HLID, 
were put in place in the 1980's when it was determined that Hayden Lake was no longer a viable 
source of domestic water. R p. 94, Rose Aff, Exhibit A, p. 58. The trial court also indicated that 
while some portions of HLID's system might be encumbered by the contracts, significant 
portions were not. The 1949 Bureau contract identified the irrigation system as consisting 
principally of a pumping plant, a wood-stave and concrete pipe discharge l i e  and a concrete 
pipe distribution system. R p. 94, Rose Aff, Exhibit C, 1949 Bureau contract. The work 
contemplated in the contract contract was to extend the discharge line and upgraded the pumping 
plant. These same assets were upgraded by the 1957 contract. The 1962 contract consisted of 
replacing corroded and deteriorated pipeline. The 1977 contract installed a well. The 
depreciation schedule of HLID's asset demonstrates that there are significantly more assets 
contained in HLID's system, even though some of the original system remains. R p. 94, Rose 
AfT, Exhibit El, Exhibit 11. In fact the pumping plant and associated pumps have been deemed 
defunct. R p. 94, Rose Aff, Exhibit A, p. 131. Viking is correct that one well was put in 
concurrent with the Bureau contract and the other wells were installed later. 
Viking contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment that 
domestic reserves are not disallowed by the Bureau contracts. The contracts address the 
irrigation system being installed by the Bureau. The 1949 contract and the 1957 contract both 
require a $4,000 reserve to be collected from irrigation assessments. However, nothing in the 
contract limits the reserves for these separate projects to $4,000. . R p. 94, Rose Aff, Exhibit C. 
The other contracts contained no provisions about requiring reserves. 
More importantly, nothing in these contracts limit HLID's ongoing ability to develop 
reserves for its domestic water system. The trial court did not err when it did not grant summary 
judgment to Viking on this issue. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Viking requests attorney fees arguing that HLID should have had its authority to charge 
connection fees predetermined by a court pursuant to I.C. Ij 7-1 30 1, et. seq. These provisions of 
Idaho law are for a court to determine if a governing body of a political subdivision has authority 
to issue bonds. It is not an avenue for an advisory opinion on interpretation of irrigation district 
law. As to the remaining arguments raised by V i g  for attorney fees, such a discussion is 
premature pending this Court's decision. 
Viking also request fees pursuant to LC. 5 12-1 17, LC. Ij 12-121, the Private attorney 
General Doctrine, 42 U.S.C. $5 1983 and 1988. V i g  presents no argument why it is entitled 
to attorney fees under these theories, therefore HLID can not respond to the argument. 
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